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NOTES
Judicial Relief for Delay in the Social Security
Administration's Disability Determination Process
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, the Social Security Administration ("the Agency")
spent an estimated eighteen billion dollars in the operation and
administration of its disability benefit insurance program.'
Considered the most costly of the federal administrative programs, 2 the Agency is also known for its long delays in deciding
meritorious claims and in providing needed financial assistance
to qualifying wage earners forced to leave the labor force due to
a severe disability. With few exceptions, exhaustion of four
administrative levels of review is mandatory before an appeal
may be made by claimants to the federal district courts. 3 Particularly severe are the delays suffered by claimants awaiting
administrative hearings. With a median waiting period for a

1. The annual cost of the Social Security Administration's disability program has
increased from $59 million in 1957 to an estimated $18 billion in 1982. The number of
qualifying disabled workers has similarly expanded from 149,850 in 1957 to an estimated
2,603,713 in 1982 Soc. SECURITY BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT. 1982, Table 85,

at 153.
There is no evidence to indicate that this increase was based on real increased incidence of disabling conditions among the population at large. A study by Social Security
Administration actuaries in June 1977 cited a variety of factors as responsible for the
growth in the benefit rolls. These factors included the increased attractiveness of benefits
under a system in which benefit levels have been substantially increased, changing attitudes on the part of individuals with impairments, increased emphasis on vocational
factors resulting in more allowances on appeal, and the increased tendency to give claimants the benefit of the doubt. S. REP. No. 648, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 4388.
2. Budget outlay by the United States Government with respect to the Department of
Health and Human Services was estimated at $227.6 billion in 1981. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No.
425 (102d ed.) (available through the Office of Management and Budget).
3. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976), a federal district court is granted jurisdiction to
review "any final decision of the Secretary." This language would therefore seem to
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hearing of over 180 days, delays of well over a year are not
uncommon.4 Asserting that these administrative delays violate
their statutory and constitutional rights,5 claimants have begun
to file class action suits in federal district court asking that the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services be
compelled to act promptly on requests for disability benefits. 6
Faced with these claims, federal courts have had to balance
the potentially extreme financial hardship suffered by an individual during the application process against the broad discretion
granted a federal agency to dictate its administrative procedure

require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to any form of judicial
relief. The United States Supreme Court, however, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), held that a court may waive the exhaustion requirement "where a claimant's
interest in having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the
agency's judgment Ion the need for exhaustion] is inappropriate." Id. at 330. In Eldridge,
the Court saw plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to administrative procedures as entirely
collateral to their substantive claims of entitlement to benefits and permitted the constitutional claim to go forward in federal court. See Caswell v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 127,
133 (1). Me. 1977) (The court noted that "it would indeed be ironic if the very delay now
under attack which prevents the exhaustion of administrative remedies ... constitutes a
barrier to this Court's jurisdiction.") affid, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Haubner v.
Ribicoff, 207 F.2d 430 (D.C. Ky. 1972) (where claim involved entitlement to benefits, claimant could not appeal a decision by the hearing examiner to the district court instead of
requesting review by the Appeals Council). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 US. 749, 765
(1975) (maintaining that "exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing
premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, [and] to afford
the parties and the courts the benefits of its ... expertise.").
4. In Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W.
3774 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1371), the named plaintiff experienced a 173-day delay
upon request for an administrative hearing. In Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Educ.
& Welfare, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978), the named plaintiff experienced a delay of 222
days before being granted a hearing. The plaintiff class in Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d
9 (1st Cir. 1978), averaged a 398-day wait between a timely request and a subsequent
hearing. In Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978), the named plaintiff waited a
period of 420 days for an administrative hearing on his claim. When none was scheduled,
despite repeated requests, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court. The Wright court
reported the results of a 1976 survey finding that the median delay between a request for
a hearing and the hearing date was over 180 days.
5. These claimants allege that the Agency's delay violates: first, the due process
clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution; second, statutory provisions of the
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976), mandating that the Agency
provide "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing"; and, third, the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), which requires that "within a reasonable time, each
agency shall proceed to conclude a matter before it."
6. Federal courts are granted power under the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-576, 701-706 (1982), to insure that statutory rights are not denied by agency inaction. Specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) provides that "a reviewing court shall.., compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
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and allocate its limited resources? Issues involved are: first, how
to determine when administrative delay is unreasonable; second,
whether administrative efficiency is a subject for judicial action;
and, third, if courts may intervene, what types of action are
appropriate. The appellate courts have adopted three conflicting
approaches in dealing with these issues. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Day v.
Schweiker8 for the October 1983 term to determine whether the
courts can order the Secretary to meet mandatory time limits
and award interim benefits to claimants in the event that such
limits are not met.
This note will first explain the administrative procedure a
claimant must undergo in pursuing a claim for social security
benefits, and will then examine the three approaches the federal
courts have used to mitigate the effects of the delays that often
occur during that procedure. The note will conclude that although courts may neither grant interim benefits without an
express waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress nor establish
mandatory time limits, courts do have the express power under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to compel the Agency
to perform its statutory duty within a reasonable time and to
order the Agency to promulgate rules prescribing self-imposed
time limits.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

In order to qualify for disability benefits, an individual must
meet specific earnings requirements, 9 be under age sixty-five, 10
7. The First Circuit in Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978), and the Second
Circuit in Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774
(U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1371), have set mandatory time limits within which an administrative hearing must be met. The Seventh Circuit in Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345
(7th Cir. 1978) and the court in Deloney v. Califano, 488 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1980), have
maintained that administrative efficiency is not a subject suitable to judicial intervention, and that, courts should therefore be reluctant to interfere absent clear evidence of
"bad faith" by the Agency or a constitutional threat. The Sixth Circuit in Blankenship v.
Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978), took the middle
ground, indicating that while judicially imposed time limits are improper, the courts may
compel the Secretary to promulgate regulations establishing time limits which the federal
district courts may then review.
8. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (No.
82-1371).
9. Under the statute, an individual must have 20 three-month quarters of coverage,
employment at which he earned pay, in the last 40 quarters prior to the three-month
period in which he became disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423 (1976). In lay terms, this
means that of the most recent ten years before disability, the individual must have
worked five. The rationale behind this requirement is that the program insures against a
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file an application ,11 and be under a disability as that term is
defined by the Social Security Act. 12 The administrative procedure a claimant must follow when seeking an award of benefits
begins when the claimant files an application with any district
office of the Agency. 13 The application and any supporting evidence is then transferred to an independent state agency which
initially determines whether a claimant is disabled. 14 These initial determinations are generally made fairly quickly by the
state agency. If the application is denied, the claimant may seek
reconsideration by the state agency by filing a written request
within sixty days.15 This is the second level of the administrative process. Since new applicants are processed first, however,
claimants requesting reconsideration usually experience at least
16
some delay.
If the claimant is not satisfied with the state agency's determination, he may request a hearing before a federal administrative law judge ("AM"), again, within sixty days. 17 Due to the
number of hearing requests, 172,000 in 1980,18 and the limited

number of ALJ's available to hear such actions,

9

an ever-

loss of earnings. To fulfill this insurance t oncept, the Act requires a somewhat recent
attachment to the labor market.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(B) (1976).
11. Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1) (1976) defines the term disability as an "inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
13. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(1) (1983).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 421(b) (1976) provides for disability determination by an independent
state agency, pursuant to an agreement between the state and the Secretary.
In 1980, more than 1,000,000 initial disability applications were filed. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, THE BEILMON REPORT,

(1982),

reprintedin 45 SoC. SEC. BULL., May, 1982, at 8.
15. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.905, .909(a)(1) (1983).
16. The named plaintiff in Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d at 19, experienced a 167-day
wait for a reconsideration determination upon his timely request.
In 1980, the Social Security Agency received an estimated 300,000 reconsideration
requests. 45 SoC. SECURITY BULL., May, 1982, at 8.
17. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, .933(b)(1) (1983).
18.

45 SOC. SECURITY BULL., May, 1982, at 9.

19. Until recently, legislative obstacles prevented efficient use of Al's.
Previously,
three distinct types of hearing officers handled Title II cases, black lung cases, and Title
XVI supplemental income (SSI) cases. In 1977, Congress gave the Secretary temporary
authority to shift SSI hearing examiners to Title II cases. Social Security Act-Hearings
and REview Procedures, Pub. L. No. 94-202, § 3, 89 Stat 1135 (1976) (amended 1978). This
temporary conversion became permanent the following year. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1383
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increasing backlog exists at this third level. 20 If the AiU renders
a decision unfavorable to the claimant, he may take the fourth
and final step and request review by the Appeals Council. 21 This
final determination by the Appeals Council exhausts a claimant's administrative remedies. 22
Thereafter, if the claimant wishes to contest the denial of
benefits, he may begin the judicial process by bringing an action
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services in federal
district court within sixty days of the Agency's final decision. 23 With few exceptions, the claimant can bring this action
only if he has exhausted his administrative remedies. 24 If the
district court's decision is unfavorable to the claimant, he may
request review by a federal court of appeals. 25 After such review,
the claimant can usually go no further, for the United States
26
Supreme Court rarely reviews Social Security disability cases.
JudicialIntervention to Remedy Administrative Inefficiency
Generally, the pace of administrative action is a matter totally
within the agency's discretion, and thus unreviewable by the
(1976 & Supp. 1 1977)). Yet, in 1980, the Secretary reported this increased number of
AhIJ's amounted to only 650. IJan.-Sept. 1980 Fed. Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(CCH)
16,739. It has also been noted that the Agency has had difficulty enlarging the
hearing staff because other civil service hearing examiners are paid more. Caswell v.
Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1978).
20. Plaintiffs have experienced delays at this level ranging from 173 days to 420 days.
See supra note 4. Total hearing requests for the Agency's combined benefit programs
numbered 226,200 in 1979, with 90,212 pending at the year's end. By 1982, that number
had jumped to an estimated 326,300 requested hearings. At the close of 1982, an estimated 155,064 cases had not been heard. S. REP. No- 648, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE & Al. NEWS 4391.
It should be noted that inevitable delay also often occurs at this level as evidence is
gathered and arrangements are made for medical and vocational experts and witnesses
to testity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935, .950(c)-(e) (1983).
21. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967-.983 (1983).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1983).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). For a detailed instructional guide on filing a disability
determination appeal in federal court, see A. ABRAHAM & D. KOPELMAN, FEDERAl. SOCIAl.
SECURITY 115-30 (1979).

24. See supra note 3. Courts may waive the exhaustion requirement when a constitutional challenge to an aspect of the administrative procedure is raised.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976) provides that no findings of fact by the Secretary shall
be reviewed. On judicial review, the courts do not hear cases de novo, and do not substitute their own findings of-fact. The scope of review is limited to a determination of
whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. Knox v. Finch,
427 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1970).
26. The Supreme Court, however, has heard challenges to the constitutionality of statutes or their application. See Philpott v. Essex Co. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973) (non-

66
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courts. The APA 27 expressly excepts from judicial review "agency
action that is committed to agency discretion by law. ' 28 Moreover, a court may not substitute an agency's method of procedure
with its own simply because it believes other procedures would
be preferable. 29 The Supreme Court, however, has established
that agency action (or inaction) challenged as a denial of constitutional or statutory rights can be immune from review, if ever,
only by the clearest manifestation of congressional intent to that
effect.30 Courts have found that when an agency fails to follow
31
its statutory mandate, judicial intervention may be necessary.
An important set of controls on administrative behavior arises
from court review of agency action. Judicial review serves an
important function by ensuring that an agency acts according to
the will of Congress as expressed in the agency's enabling legislation. 32 The Supreme Court has refused to limit the activities of
each branch of the federal government to prevent overlap or
blending of their functions. 33 The legislative history of the APA
evidences an intent that federal agency action not go unchecked
by the courts, indicating that the Act is "an outline of minimal
essential standards and procedures .

.

. including a simplified

standard of administrative review." 34 Moreover, provisions in
the APA state that federal agencies may only use the defense of
sovereign immunity to bar judicial review in actions where the
plaintiff seeks money damages.35

assignability of disability insurance benefits); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971)
(physician's reports prepared solely for purposes of disability determination admissible
despite their hearsay character): Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (termination of
benefits to deported aliens).
27. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576, 701-706 (1982).
28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2) (1982).
29. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978); Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Gonzales v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). Congress has also emphasized this requirement. "The statutes of Congress are
not merely advisory when they relate to administrative agencies. To preclude judicial
review . . . a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face, give
clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it." H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1205.
31. Day, 685 F.2d at 22; Blankenship, 587 F.2d at 335; Caswell, 583 F.2d at 16.
32. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
33. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen'l Serv. Admin., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
34. H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1195.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
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Even though an agency enjoys wide discretion in establishing
the procedures it will follow and the actions it will take, judicial
intervention is appropriate when it is alleged that the agency
has violated its statutory duty. In addition, courts may take an
active role in providing equitable relief for the harm caused by
these violations. Although the Social Security Administration
enjoys considerable freedom to fashion its own rules of procedure, courts may properly intervene in response to clear violations of the Agency's statutory duty.
THREE JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DELAYS
IN THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS

Recently claimants seeking disability benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act have presented federal courts with claims
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services for unreasonable delays in processing their applications. In deciding these
cases, the federal courts of appeals have agreed on one point:
exhaustion does not operate to prevent judicial review. 36 Their determinations of appropriate remedies, however,

36. The First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits properly rejected the Secretary's
allegations concerning lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
and timing, any of which may preclude plaintiffs from bringing their complaints of
administrative delay to federal courts. Jurisdiction is thus generally granted, since the
Agency itself grants jurisdiction to federal courts to review "final decisions of the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). Where a plaintiff's claim of a statutory or constitutional
violation is entirely collateral to the issue of eligibility for benefits, courts have found that
the plaintiffs claim is final for purposes of review. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 318
(1976), where the Supreme Court found that the jurisdictional prerequisite of a final decision was satisfied when the plaintiff presented his claim and the Secretary denied it. The
Court viewed § 405(g) as providing jurisdiction over a final issue admittedly collateral to
plaintiffs claim of entitlement to benefits. See also Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st
Cir. 1978), wherein the court commented that "requiring a final determination might
moot any individual plaintiffs claim of right." The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is similarly waived for such a collateral claim. (In Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330, the Supreme Court held that in certain cases the court may
waive the exhaustion requirement. Such a case arises where plaintiffs statutory and
constitutional claims are entirely collateral to their substantive claim of entitlement.)
It has been noted that questions of timing merge with the merits in claims of adminis-

trative delay, since the passage of an unreasonable amount of time is the situation that
the plaintiff seeks to eliminate. Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 587
F.2d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 1978). See Bermann, Administrative Delay and its Control, 30 AM.
J. COMP. L. 473, 479-82 (1982) (a general discussion of the barriers to judicial relief:
"[T]iming questions should never be an independent barrier to a judicial decision on a

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

vary widely, turning primarily upon their interpretations of the
following issues: first, how to balance the conflicting interests to
determine whether administrative delay is unreasonable; second,
whether administrative efficiency is a subject for judicial action
given the differing scopes of authority of judicial review and
agency discretion; and, third, if courts may intervene, what types
of action the courts may take given the separation of powers
principle, the courts' express statutory grants of power to provide
an equitable remedy, and the courts' own perception regarding
their levels of expertise in the complex problems of administrative agency inefficiency.
The federal appellate courts' decisions have exhibited three
distinct approaches to these issues. In Day v. Schweiker 7 and
3 the courts established strict time limits
Caswell v. Califano
and ordered the Secretary to render disability determinations
within those time limits or pay interim benefits to the claimants
until such decisions are made.3 9 Wright v. Califano,40 on the
other hand, held that absent allegations of "bad faith" or a dilatory attitude, the delays complained of were not so unreasonable
as to justify the court's resort to mandatory time limits and presumptive eligibility.4 1 The court in Blankenship v. Secretary of

claim of delay, since the controversy .. .will not become ripe by further delay.") To
prevent injustice, courts have considered the delay itself to be the agency's final decision.
See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston,,295 F.2d 856, 865 (4th Cir. 1961) (holding that
although delay may not be final in the usual sense of the word, when it amounts to a
violation of the APA, it is "final action").
37. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (No.
82-1371).
38. 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
39. See also Sharpe v. Harris, 621 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming district court
decision imposing time limits on hearings and decisions and granting payments to SSI
applicants); Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming district court's 90day mandatory time limit, but reversing the interim benefit provision as an abuse of
discretion); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)
(ordering Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to reduce time delays and provide
interim benefits to claimants forced to wait longer than judicially imposed schedule time);
Crosby v. Social Security Admin. of the United States, 550 F. Supp. 1278 (D.C. Mass.
1982) (ordering 180-day maximum time limit for obtaining a hearing); Martinez v. Califano, No. 73 C 900, (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1978) (ordering the Secretary to reduce waiting
period to 150 days and grant interim benefits to claimants required to wait longer).
40. 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
41. See also Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1981) (class certification
denied pending amendment of regulations by Secretary of Health and Human Services to
provide uniform nationwide rules establishing reasonable time limits); Deloney v. Califano, 488 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. 111. 1980) (delays processing disability claims not so unreason-
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Health, Education & Welfare42 established a third approach by
ordering the Secretary to promulgate rules providing for an
43
administrative hearing within a specified period of time.
Mandatory Time Limits and PresumptiveEligibility:
Day v. Schweiker and Caswell v. Califano
In both Day v. Schweiker 44 and Caswell v. Califano,45 plaintiffs seeking to obtain disability benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act filed class action suits asserting that they
had experienced unreasonable delays awaiting reconsideration
decisions and administrative hearings. 46 Plaintiffs sought relief
on statutory 47 and constitutional 48 grounds. The district courts
found the delays to be unreasonably lengthy and therefore in
violation of the Secretary's statutory duty to provide a hearing
within a reasonable time. 49 Both courts found that it was unnecessary to rule on the due process issue since statutory relief was
50
available.
The two courts fashioned nearly identical remedies by imposing mandatory time limits, ordering the Secretary to render
reconsideration decisions and schedule administrative hearings

able as to warrant judicial intervention in administrative process).
42. 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978).
43. See also Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1979) (ordering Secretary
to submit a plan reducing the time for administrative hearings to within a reasonable
time). See generally Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 517 F. Supp. 77
(W.D. Ky. 1981) (allowing Secretary to lengthen self-imposed time limits to 165 days);
Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 522 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Ky. 1981)
(denying approval of Secretary's proffered sanction of administrative action against
ALJ's for failure to meet time limits); Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 533 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (lengthening time limitation to 180 days at Secretary's request).
44. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) (No.
82-1371).
45. 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978).
46. Both cases were filed after an initial determination by the appropriate state
agency had been made and plaintiffs were awaiting either the scheduling of or the issuance of a decision in reconsideration and administrative hearings. Day, 685 F.2d at 21;
Caswell, 583 F.2d at 11.
47. See supra note 6.
48. The fifth amendment provides, in relevant part, that "no person shall ...
be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V.
49. Day, 685 F.2d at 22; Caswell, 583 F.2d at 11.
50. See infra note 80 (discussing the history of due process rights of a Title II disability applicant).
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within ninety days of a claimant's request. 1 In addition, as a
sanction, the district court in Day ordered the Secretary to award
interim benefits to claimants if these deadlines were not met,
regardless of the likelihood that a favorable decision would be
subsequently made.5 2 Both courts stipulated that any delays
attributable to the claimant would toll the expiration of the
53
mandatory time period.
On appeal, the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals
affirmed the district courts' decisions that the administrative
delays were statutory violations and upheld the courts' remedies
establishing mandatory time limits and interim benefits. 54 Both
courts found that judicial intervention was not only appropriate,
but necessary. Citing Caswell, the Day court reasoned that
although Congress had entrusted the Secretary with administration of the disability insurance program, that delegation of
authority does not preclude a judicial role, particularly when a
statutory mandate is being disregarded.5 5 Similarly, the Caswell
court held that although the Agency has substantial discretion
in carrying out its administrative tasks, this discretion does not
protect a system that routinely schedules hearings with unreasonable delay.5 6 The Caswell court indicated that when the delays exceed the bounds of reasonableness, the court may order
57
the Agency to act promptly to meet its statutory obligation.
In analyzing the issue of the unreasonableness of the delays,
the courts weighed the financial hardship of the applicant

51. In Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d at 22, the Secretary was ordered by the district
court to complete reconsideration processing and schedule hearings within 90 days of the
claimant's request. In Caswell v. Califano, the district court's order required the Secretary
to schedule and hold hearings in Title II disability cases within 120 days of a claimant's
request beginning Dec. 31, 1977, and within 90 days of such request beginning July 1,
1978. 583 F.2d at 11 n.2. Additionally, the Caswell court ordered the Secretary to submit
progress reports to allow the courts to monitor compliance. Id. at 11.
52. Interim benefit payments were to be made, subject to recoupment if the claimant
later failed to qualify, whenever no reconsideration determination was issued within 180
days of a request for reconsideration or whenever no hearing was held within 180 days of
a hearing request. Day, 685 F.2d at 22.
53. The Caswell court excluded periods of delay directly caused by a claimant's failure
to provide essential information and other delays. 583 F.2d at 11 n.2. Similarly, the Day
court excepted delays in reconsideration and in holding hearings caused by plaintiffs
failure to appear or failure to provide information, plaintiffs request for a delay, or for
other such reasons. 685 F.2d at 22 nn.6,7.
54. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 16; Day, 685 F.2d at 24.
55. 685 F.2d at 22.
56. 583 F.2d at 15.
57. Id.

1983]

Delay in Social Security Benefits

against the inherent efficiency problems of the Agency. The
Second Circuit in Day expressed concern for the Agency's problems, but rejected the argument that a "flood of claims" would
prevent the Secretary from adhering to a judicially-mandated
timetable. 58 The court instead looked to the severe hardships
imposed on wage earners by administrative delay and found
that these delays detracted from the very purpose of the disability program. 59 Similarly, the Caswell court noted that it realized
that the problem was not only endemic to the First Circuit, but
was nationwide, with a backlog of cases reaching an all time
high.6 0 The court also noted that it was aware of attempts by
Congress and the Secretary to reduce the delays.6 1 Both courts,
however, concluded that the plight of the disability applicant
outweighed these other considerations and that judicial interven62
tion therefore would be necessary.
Both courts considered the presence of a possible separation of
powers problem, but decided that previous congressional action
would not prevent judicial intervention. The Day court indicated
that implicit in Congress's enactment of solely managerial types
of remedies was its belief that the courts were effectively handling the problem. The Day court therefore maintained that it
had a duty to vindicate the plaintiffs' interests only so long as
Congress had not enacted clarifying legislation or removed the
term "reasonable" from the statute.6 3 Similarly, the Caswell
court indicated that although Congress bears the responsibility
for remedying problems in its administrative agencies and may
enact legislation clarifying or modifying the statutes at issue,
this does not preclude judicial intervention in the absence of

58. Day,685 F.2d at 23.
59. Id. at 25 (citing its previous decision, White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)).
60. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 12. An unanticipated flood of claims were filed under the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (1976), and under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, which provides supplemental security income for the
aged, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1976).
61. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 12. Congress had recently passed legislation allowing the
Secretary to allocate personnel temporarily to backlogged areas of the country, (Social
Security Act-Hearings and Review Procedures, Pub. L. No. 94-202, § 3, 89 Stat. 1135
(1976) (amended 1978)), and to increase the number of AI,'s (Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-216, § 371, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1383
(1976 & Supp. I 1977)). Additionally, the Secretary had opened a new hearing office in
Maine and assigned three ALJ's to the office. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 13.
62. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 16.
63. Day,685 F.2d at 23.
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such clarifying legislation when the law as written is being
6
violated. 1
The appellate courts turned finally to the issue of the validity
of the ninety day time limitations that the district courts had
imposed on the Agency. In upholding the time limits, both indicated that courts have considerable discretion to formulate such
equitable remedies. 65 The appellate courts refused to accept the
Secretary's argument that mandatory time limits would not
solve the delay but would only cause a nationwide shift of scarce
resources. Although mindful of the decision's impact, the Caswell court indicated it "could hardly permit the legal rights of
litigants to turn upon the alleged inability of the defendant fully
to meet his obligations to others." 66 The Day court, with little
comment, also upheld the district court's order compelling the
Secretary to award interim benefits to claimants if the time lim67
its were not met.
Deference to Agency Discretion:
Wright v. Califano
68 the named
In Wright v. Califano,
plaintiff filed suit seeking
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act against the
Secretary on behalf of himself and other similarly situated applicants.6 9 The complaint alleged that the Secretary's failure to

64. Caswell, 583 F.2d at 17.
65. Id. They supported this position by citing to prior First Circuit decisions that also
had prescribed mandatory time limits to alleviate administrative delay.
66. Id.
67. Day, 685 F.2d at 23.
68. 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
69. Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1976), provides for the
disbursement of old age benefits (§ 401) and survivor's benefits (§ 402), in addition to
disability benefits (§ 404). As a claimant under § 401 or § 402 must follow the same four
level administrative process as a claimant for disability, the same types of delays are
experienced.
The Wright decision denied relief in the form of mandatory time limits and interim
benefits to plaintiff applicants for old age and survivor's benefits. The following year, the
court in Deloney v. Califano, 488 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ill. 1980) held that this decision
applied to disability benefits under Title II as well. In expanding the Wright decision to
include disability benefits and in finding that mandatory time limits and interim benefits
were inappropriate, the Deloney court followed a line of reasoning identical to Wright.
Citing Wright extensively, the district court maintained that Wright was equally applicable where plaintiffs challenged delays in all levels of disability determination. Id. at
614. Thus Wright v. Califano may be credited as the decision which established the Seventh Circuit's denial of mandatory time limits and interim benefits in the event of delay
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provide administrative hearings for each claim within a "reasonable time" violated the plaintiffs statutory and constitutional
rights. 70 The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment, finding the lengthy delays violated the
mandates of the Social Security Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act. The court then ordered the Secretary either to
render administrative hearing decisions within ninety days from
the date of request or pay interim benefits until the Secretary
71
rendered a final decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 72 It found that delays in the administrative
procedure were not so unreasonable as to justify resort to the
court's extraordinary equitable powers to impose mandatory
time limits or to presume benefit eligibility.7 3 The Seventh Circuit viewed the conflicting interests differently than the First or
Second Circuits, looking at the delay problem within a "broader
context" with a view from the agency's perspective. 74 The court
found that a certain amount of waiting time would always be
inevitable, and that the reasonableness of any delay should be
judged in relation to the Agency's attempts to cope with the
problem in light of its severe resource constraints. The court
would only consider a delay unreasonable when, for example,
there was evidence of a dilatory attitude, or when the amount of
time was disproportionate to that normally required. Viewed
from this perspective, the court found that the particular delays
75
experienced by the plaintiffs were not unreasonable.
The Wright court indicated that judicial intervention in the
procedures of a federal agency are usually inappropriate. The
appellate court stated that it would be an extremely rare case
where a district court would be justified in holding that the mere
passage of time presented an occasion for intervening in the
administrative process. 76 Moreover, the Wright court felt that
the judiciary could not accurately determine the appropriate
length of time; at best, only a relative standard such as "reain the processing of Title II claims.
70.

See supra note 6.

71. Wright v. Califano, [1977-1978] UEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) Soc. Security
(N.D. Ill.
Aug. 2, 1977), rev'd, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1978).
72. Wright, 587 F.2d at 347.
73. Id. at 354.
74. Id. at 351-52.
75. Id. at 353.
76. Id. at 352 (citing FTC v. Weingarten, 336 F.2d 687, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1964)).
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sonable dispatch" could be created. 77 The Wright court further
noted that Congress itself had continuously monitored the administrative delay problem and that it had found mandatory
time limits inappropriate. 78 The court maintained that absent a
constitutional violation or a clear violation of congressional
intent the judiciary should hesitate to interfere in a matter of
administrative efficiency, a subject not particularly suited to
79
judicial evaluation.
Of the four decisions, the Wright court alone addressed the
argument that administrative delays violate due process rights
as provided by the fifth amendment. The court acknowledged
that public assistance claimants do own "property rights" in
benefits actually due and owing. The court found, however, that
no property right attached to future benefits existing only as a
mere possibility and that there was therefore no deprivation of
80
property that called for due process protection.

77. Wright, 587 F.2d at 353. See generally Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241 (lst Cir. 1973), a class action in which members of a state bar

and litigants alleged that the state's failure to provide sufficient court facilities and personnel violated the sixth amendment. The court denied relief to the class, indicating that
the district court would have to translate the due process clause into formulae and timetables establishing the maximum permissible delay. Id. at 1244.
78. See Delays in Social Security Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
79. Wright, 587 F.2d at 353.
80. Id. at 354-56. The due process clause protects against deprivation of property without due process of law. Traditionally, the property interests protected have been defined
quite narrowly; monetary government benefits distributed to individuals were considered
mere "privileges" bestowed by the government rather than protected property rights. A
recipient whose public assistance benefits were terminated was denied the due process
protection afforded the owner of a recognized property right because receipt of a benefit
was seen as a privilege not a right. In 1970, the Supreme Court abandoned the right/privilege distinction in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), holding that welfare recipients
have a protected property right in the benefits received. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), the court found that disability benefit recipients enjoyed this same protected
property status. With the demise of the right/privilege controversy in the Mathews and
Goldberg decisions, it therefore becomes necessary to determine in each instance whether
the claimant has a sufficient entitlement to an important benefit to constitute a right and
hence invoke constitutional protection.
The Day, Caswell, and Blankenship courts circumvented the issue of potential property
rights by finding that a statutory violation had occurred and then granting relief to the
plaintiff on statutory grounds. The Wright court alone approached the issue. In determining whether new applicants were to be afforded the protected property right given disability benefit recipients, the Wright court identified three factors to be balanced: first, the
private interest to be affected; second, the value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and, third, the fiscal and administrative burdens on the government that
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Upon consideration of
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The Middle Ground:
Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
In Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,"'
83
applicants seeking benefits under Title 1182 and Title XV1 of
the Social Security Act brought a class action suit against the
Secretary. Plaintiffs challenged delays by the Secretary in scheduling administrative hearings, seeking relief on statutory and
constitutional grounds. The district court granted them summary judgment, finding that the agency had both a statutory
and a constitutional duty to provide a hearing within a "reasonable time," and that the delays experienced by plaintiffs stretched
well beyond the bounds of reasonableness. 8 4 The district court
issued an order requiring the Secretary to schedule administrative hearings for plaintiff class members within ninety days of a
request.85 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however,
reversed this decision and remanded the case with instructions
to require the Secretary to formulate his own regulations requiring administrative hearings to be scheduled within a specified
16
time.
The appellate court weighed the conflicting interests of the
Agency and an applicant and affirmed that the delays experienced by plaintiffs were unreasonable. Even though the court
found no evidence of a dilatory motive by the Agency and noted
that the Agency had limited resources to meet a dramatically
increased caseload,8 7 the court reported that the lengthy delays
were intolerable, since the applicants had suffered substantial
hardship and were only trying to obtain the necessities of life.88

these factors, the court held that "in the name of due process as a flexible standard" it

would not impose time limits upon an agency which in good faith without arbitrary
actions had demonstrated an inability to comply. 587 F.2d at 356.
81. 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1976). Title II provides Old-Age, Survivor's and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) benefits.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1976). Title XVI provides supplemental security income
to individuals who are aged, blind or disabled.
84.

Blankenship v. Mathews, [1976-1977] UEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) Soc. Security

14,739 (W.D. Ky. May 6, 1976), rev'd, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1967).
85. Id.
86. Blankenship, 587 F.2d at 331.
87. Id. at 334.
88. Id.
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Turning to the issue of the appropriate remedy, however,\the
Sixth Circuit found the district court's mandatory time limits
inappropriate.8 9 The court focused on the intent of Congress,
noting that even though the legislature had prescribed time limits in other types of social security proceedings, 90 the procedure
and fact-finding necessary in disability cases precluded fixed
time limitations and demanded instead a more flexible "reasonable time" standard.9 1 The court also maintained that it would
be "inappropriate and inconsistent with the principle of separa92
tion of powers" to dictate any hard and fast deadlines.
The Blankenship court also expressed concern that, since the
problem of delay was nationwide, a mandatory time limit would
necessitate a shift of scarce personnel and resources from other
parts of the country, causing even more severe delays elsewhere.
The court was of the opinion that time limits imposed without a
thorough understanding of the problem might make government
93
unworkable.
The Sixth Circuit made it clear, however, that the judiciary
was not required to stand helplessly by and deny plaintiffs' relief
simply because of the complexity of the delay problem. Rather,
the court issued an order requiring the Agency to exercise its
rulemaking authority to formulate regulations establishing reasonable time limits for scheduling hearings.9 4 In keeping with
the separation of powers doctrine, the courts' role would then be
to review the "reasonableness" of the proposed regulations.
FASHIONING A JUDICIAL REMEDY
The problem of administrative delay is not new to the courts.
Judicial relief from protracted administrative delay was first

89. Id. at 335.
90. Under Title XVI, applicants for SSI in non-disability cases are to be afforded a
determination on their claim within 90 days after requesting a hearing. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(2) (1976).
91. Blankenship,587 F.2d at 335.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Upon remand, the district court authorized publication of experimental regulations providing that an administrative hearing be scheduled within 90 days of a request.
These regulations were subsequently amended by the Secretary with court approval to
provide for an overall time limit of 165 days, after the Secretary cited statistics indicating
the experimental deadlines were rarely met and the backlog was increasing despite a
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granted by the United States Supreme Court in 1926.95 Since
then, numerous cases have addressed the problem of administrative delay in the federal agencies.9 6 While delay is certainly
undesirable, it may be inevitable when its source lies in the complexity of the issues to be resolved and the amount of information that must be assimilated and considered. In addition, the
specialized mission of an administrative agency often necessi97
tates a certain amount of delay.
Four federal courts of appeals analyzed the problem of delay
within the Social Security Administration's disability determination process and arrived at widely dissimilar solutions. The differences in their conflicting decisions turned upon how they balanced the Agency's hardships against those suffered by the
disability applicants; whether they found judicial intervention
appropriate to remedy problems of administrative inefficiency;
and what they considered to be the best form of relief to provide
plaintiffs challenging such delays.
Balancingof Interests
Severely disabled individuals critically need prompt financial
assistance to meet the necessary expenses of life as well as the
determined concentration of resources. 519 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. Ky. 1981). In allowing the
Secretary to amend the regulations, the district court indicated that its mandate did not
permit it to impose duties on the Secretary that could not be performed.
95. In Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926), Illinois Bell successfully
contended that a state commerce commission's five year delay unconstitutionally deprived
the company of its property without due process of law.
96. See generally NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258 (1969) (Supreme Court
reversed previous decision shifting the cost of a long delay in processing the case from
employer to employees); Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding district
court order that all requests for medical benefits not timely processed under the Department of Public Aid's prior approval procedures be automatically approved); Nader v.
FCC, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court ordered the Federal Communications Commission to submit a proposed timetable to complete a certain investigation); Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court ordered the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to institute proceedings to withhold federal funds from schools failing to
desegregate); Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(role of court described as insuring that the Secretary of Agriculture excercised his discretion within a reasonable time, FTC v. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964) (court
found that Federal Trade Commission was not proceeding with dispatch to investigate a
complaint pending two years against a third by plaintiffs); Deering Milliken, Inc. v.
Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961) (determining that second remand by National
Labor Relations Board was in violation of Board's duty to dispose of a case with reasonable dispatch).
97. See Skiffington, Federal Administrative Delay: Judicial Remedies and Applica-
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burdensome medical costs associated with sickness or injury.
Less severely impaired individuals, although their needs may
not be quite so acute, also require speedy relief, since meeting the
definition of "disabled" requires a complete withdrawal from the
labor force and frequently the consequent loss of all financial
security. 98 The Day, Caswell, and Blankenship courts found that
claimants meeting this definition suffered unreasonable delays
waiting for administrative hearings.
The Wright court, however, balanced the interests involved to
achieve a different result. The court agreed that the Agency had
a statutory duty to provide a claimant with the type of administrative review requested within a reasonable time, but indicated
that the problem was to give content to the word "reasonable" in
the circumstances presented. The court commented that it was
not unsympathetic to the deprivations that the delays could
cause and acknowledged that the First and Second Circuits had
focused primarily on the plaintiffs' interests in finding the delays
unreasonable. The court found that the reasonableness of the
delays must be judged in light of the resources that Congress
had supplied the Agency as well as the impact of the delays on
the applicants' interests. 99
In balancing these interests, the Wright court failed to give
adequate weight to the plight of the wage earner. The court took
note of the systemwide nature of the delays and the Agency's
reported lack of resources. It also considered Congress's concern
for quality adjudication. While the court acknowledged that the
Agency has a statutory duty, it failed to explain how this duty
should be fulfilled. In essence, the court advocated a shift in
focus from the claimant to the Agency. Applying this type of
analysis, the court was therefore able to find that the particular
delays complained of were not so unreasonable as to require
judicial intervention.100

tions in the Natural Resources Context, 28 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 671 (1972).
98. The definition of disability requires "an inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1), (1976). Therefore, a claimant may perform
neither his former work activity nor any other form of work while his application is
pending. Moreover, the regulations require a waiting period before benefits are payable;
an individual must be disabled for five months before he begins to receive benefits. 42
U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D) (1967). These required periods of inactivity alone are a financial
hardship to the claimant in addition to any procedural delay.
99. Wright, 587 F.2d at 351.
100. Id. at 354.
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Additionally, in finding that the delays suffered were not
unreasonable, the court noted that plaintiffs had made no allegations of "bad faith," a dilatory attitude, or a lack of evenhandedness. 10 ' While it is true that these specific allegations
were not made, the fact that the Agency failed to meet its statutory duty to plaintiffs might evidence some degree of "bad
faith."' 10 2 Moreover, the court impliedly commended the Agency
for an evenhanded, systemwide failure to comply with its duty.
Finally, the court left unanswered what action it would take if it
found the Agency to have acted in bad faith.
Another ground for the court's finding that administrative
delays were not unreasonable was its observation that plaintiffs
had made no suggestion to increase productivity and no allegations of specific inefficiencies within the Agency's administrative procedure. 10 3 This was an unfair expectation since the complexity and size of the Social Security Administration make it
unlikely that the plaintiffs could have proffered suggestions to
the Agency to remedy its administrative problems. Since the
court itself admitted a reluctance to intervene, its criticism of
plaintiffs' failure to do so holds plaintiffs to an unreasonablyhigh standard of expertise. 10

4

101. Id. at 353.
102. In Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926), Illinois Bell successfully
challenged the state commerce commission's two year delay. The court noted that the
commission's conduct "evinces an entire lack of that acute appreciation of justice which
should characterize a tribunal charged with [this] delicate and important duty." Id. at
591.
The Secretary has argued that the administrative delays should be viewed in part as
reflecting a concern for accurate determinations of entitlement to disability insurance.
This argument has gained some support from scholars who note that, increasingly, delay
is found among well-intending agencies following lengthy procedures designed to produce fairer and more accurate decisions. Bermann, Administrative Delay and its Control,
30 AM. J. COMp. L. 473, 474 (1980). It has also been noted, however, that delay may be
caused by regulations serving no legitimate purpose or by inefficiency within the agency,
rather than the complex and technical nature of the agency's specialized purpose. If so,
they are unnecessary and may be unreasonable. Skiffington, supra note 97, at 679.
103. Wright, 587 F.2d at 353.
104. Reduction of administrative agency delay has been the subject of numerous articles. In Mashaw, How Much of What Quality: A Comment on Conscientious Procedural
Design, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 823 (1980), for example, the author confronts the question of
how far to push the demand for timeliness. The author notes that while delay reduction
has political and judicial support, Congress's unwillingness to incur additional administrative costs suggests that reductions in delay will only come at the cost of increased
error unless adjudicative "technology" can be improved in some way. See also Chassman, Social Security Disability Hearings:A Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due
Process, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (1980); Schwarz, Adjudication Process under U.S. Social
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One approach to evaluating the unreasonableness of administrative delay would be to weigh the Agency's justification for
delay against the harm the delay causes the applicant.1 0 5 This
balancing test would properly consider the needs of a disabled
applicant and at the same time afford the Agency reasonable
time to determine whether a disability actually exists. Applying
this test, a court might find that an administrative delay is reasonable if its source lay in the complexity of the administrative
process and the amount of information to be considered. If, on
the other hand, a delay is without sufficient justification then a
court could find that the delay is unreasonable and therefore in
violation of the plaintiff's statutory rights.
Finding the AppropriateForm of Relief
Courts have emphasized that an active judicial role is needed
when statutory rights are violated by unreasonable administrative
delays. 1 6 They have, however, formed no consensus as to the
definition of unreasonable or the appropriate remedy. Each court's
approach varies according to how it views its equitable authority.
Judicially-Imposed Time Limits
Judicially-imposed time limits on the Agency's procedures may
violate the dictates of the doctrine of separation of powers.1 07 In
essence, rules and regulations are the administrative equivalent
of statutes. Congress, through its enabling legislation, grants
authority to federal agencies to promulgate these rules.10 8 The
separation of powers principle operates to provide exclusive authority in federal agencies as sole delegatees of congressional
power. To properly comply with this principle, the courts must
defer to the Agency's rulemaking authority. 0 9
Security Disability Law, 32 AD. L. REV. 555 (1980) (suggests elimination of the reconsideration and Appeals Council levels of the disability determination process).
105. Goldman, Administrative Delay and JudicialRelief, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1423, 1448
(1968).
106. Day, 685 F.2d at 22; Blankenship, 587 F.2d at 336; Caswell, 583 F.2d at 15.
107. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
108. The Social Security Administration was granted exclusive authority by Congress
by Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 624 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405). 42
U.S.C. § 405(a) provides in relevant part: "The Secretary shall have full power and
authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent
with the provisions of the title, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such
provisions ......
109. See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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The APA does not grant authority to the courts to draft rules
of administrative procedure. It provides instead for a simplified
standard of administrative review. 10 Rules and regulations promulgated by an agency are subject to review and approval by
the courts before their final publication in the Code of Federal
Regulations, the general body of regulatory laws governing procedure before federal administrative agencies.11 In 1977, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this separation of duties
in a decision regarding the APA's informal rulemaking provisions. The Court found that the APA's provisions for judicial
review of "pre-publication" regulations established the maximum
limit of judicial intervention into an agency's rulemaking authority." 2 The Court emphasized that reviewing courts are not free to

grant additional procedural rights if the agency itself has not
3
11
chosen to do so.

Even if it were within the power of a court to impose time limits, it would very likely cause more harm than good. Courts are
generally ill-equipped to make fixed timetables out of an agency's duty to provide a hearing within a reasonable time. The
Supreme Court has not even attempted to quantify the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial in criminal cases, one of the
Constitution's most fundamental edicts against unreasonable
delay. 4 Similarly, federal courts presented with actions challenging delays in the state courts have declined to mold remedies
with formulae and timetables. 115
Moreover, since the agency's delays are systemwide, time limits would accomplish little more than a nationwide shifting of
resources, exacerbating hearing delays in other parts of the
country. Given that the Agency has a limited amount of resources available and that the courts lack a thorough understanding

110. See supra note 34.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) requires that "notice of proposed rulemaking shall be
published in the Federal Register. § 553(c) provides that the agency "shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process through submission of
written data."
112. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978). See also United States v. Florida East Coast R.R., 410 U.S. 224
(1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
113. 435 U.S. at 524.
114. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). "We cannot definitely say how long is too
long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate." Id. at 521.
115. Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Admin. v. Massachusetts, 488 F.2d 1241 (lst Cir.
1973); Kail v. Rockerfeller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
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of the mechanics of administrative procedure, time limits in this
16

setting may make government unworkable.Lastly, the relatively swift decisions required by courts may
not necessarily be accurate. 1 7 If time limitations are imposed,
the Agency may be forced to make decisions based on incomplete evidence. This would create a tremendous hardship on
deserving applicants. If a claim is denied, the evidence cannot be
heard on appeal to the federal courts since de novo review is
unavailable.11 8 In this instance as well, harm may be caused as
a result of permitting courts to prescribe and enforce time limits.
Interim Benefits
Although a court's authority to award interim benefits arguably flows from its equitable power to fashion remedies, providing
this type of remedy may not be within the court's authority.
The legislature must expressly authorize disbursement from
the federal treasury to satisfy a particular class of claims. In
addition, the courts may not grant monetary relief as a remedy
to plaintiffs in cases of administrative delay against the United
States absent a congressional act waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States. The Supreme Court has emphasized
that the terms and conditions defined by Congress for creating
government liability preclude this type of remedy.1 19 The Court
has further indicated that a grant of a right of action by the
federal government must be made with specificity,1 20 and has
emphasized the courts' duty to observe the conditions defined by
121
Congress when charging the public treasury.
A 1976 amendment to the APA eliminated the defense of sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review in actions against
federal agencies seeking non-monetary relief.1 22 The amendment
served to reinforce previous judicial and legislative mandates
that the courts were not to grant monetary relief in cases where

116. Blankenship, 587 F.2d at 335.
117. Schwartz, supra note 104, at 555.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976) provides that "no findings of fact or decisions of the
Secretary shall be reviewed."
119. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1
(1969); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
120. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400.
121. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981).
122. See supra note 35.
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sovereign immunity was not expressly waived. 123 Moreover, Con-

gress and the Secretary have prescribed specific limited situations in which interim benefits will be granted. A qualifying
individual receiving benefits who is found initially to be no
longer disabled may request continued benefits until the Agency
124
has reached a final decision.

Despite sympathetic reasons for providing interim benefits to
claimants awaiting determination of their applications, 125 no
statutory authority exists for such a remedy. On the contrary,
the APA expresses the intent that monetary claims brought
government do not create a
against an agency of the federal
126
waiver of sovereign immunity.
Compelling Agency Action
Although the APA restricts judicial review of actions within
an agency's discretion, the Act also requires that the agency proceed with dispatch to conduct all matters before it.127 Courts
have emphasized that administrative discretion is not a license
for lethargy. Judicial review extends to failure to take action as
well as abuse in acting.1 28 Although courts have found that the
Secretary's delays have violated a statutory duty and that judicial intervention has been necessary, an active rulemaking role
by the courts is inappropriate. The courts, however, need not
abdicate their role in cases of unreasonable administrative delay.
The express grant of power under the APA is an effective tool
which allows the federal courts to compel an agency to act
promptly against alleviating unreasonable delay.1 29 Under this
provision, a court may thus order an agency to act promptly to
3
meets its statutory duty.'1

123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 423(g) (1976) provides for continued payments of disability benefits
during appeal in any case where:
(A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits,
(B) the impairment on the basis of which such benefits are payable is found to
have ceased or to no longer be disabling, and
(C) a timely request for a hearing is pending.
125. Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3774
(U.S. Apr. 25, 1983) ( No. 82-1371).
126. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 6.
128. Poirrier v. St. James Parrish Police Jury, 372 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd,
531 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1975).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) (1982).
130. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 860-61 (4th Cir. 1961).
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Courts have successfully remedied the effects of protracted
delay within other regulatory agencies by ordering the offending
agency to perform some type of action it is statutorily required to
perform. 3 1 In some cases, courts have also required an agency
to submit a timetable for agency action instead of the court
imposing its own. 13 2 Courts have then retained jurisdiction to
approve and monitor the proposed timetable. The agency is
expected to meet its schedule and explain any failure to do
so.13 3 Courts also have compelled funding agencies to institute
proceedings, 134 and at times have even ordered an agency to
withhold funds from recipients who violate federal laws as a
coercive measure to comply.1 3 5 Failure of the agency to take
1 36
such action may be seen as a dereliction of duty.
In a 1973 Second Circuit case, plaintiffs providing medical
care under the Medicare Act claimed that the Social Security
Administration failed to promptly reimburse them according to
the requirements of that Act.1 37 The court provided relief to the
plaintiffs because it found authority within the provisions of the
APA to compel the Agency to promulgate regulations consistent
with the court's announced interpretation of the statute.
In adopting the APA, Congress intended, among other things,
to provide a remedy to those injured by unwarranted official

131. See Las Vegas Hawaiian Dev. Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp.
928 (D. Hawaii 1979) (court may compel commission to either terminate examination
or institute proceedings); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Moore Group, Inc.,
416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (EEOC ordered to dismiss Title VII action brought
against employer on grounds of unreasonable delay); North Amer. Van Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 412 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (Interstate Commerce Commission order
to decide applications stayed for improper reasons).
132. Nader v. Federal Commerce Comm'n, 520 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (court ordered
FCC to submit a proposed timetable for determining the lawfulness of the applicant telephone company's proposed rate increases).
133. Id. In North Amer. Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind.
1976), the court emphasized that a "deliberate policy of institutionalized delay by administrative agency in considering applications for licenses must be closely scrutinized and
purported justifications tested against actual practices." Id. at 792.
134. See Silverman v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1976) (court found that delay by
National Labor Relations Board of more than five years in computing amount of back
pay to be awarded employees under Board's decision was the type of inaction which
violates the mandates of the APA).
135. In Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court enjoined the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to institute proceedings withholding federal
funds for 10 state school systems for failure to desegregate.
136. Id.
137. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973).
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delay13 8 The APA's legislative history emphasizes that no agency
should be permitted to cause any person to suffer from administrative delays. The purpose of the compelling provision was thus
to provide a wronged individual with the right of enforcement.
The power of the courts to compel an agency to set the time
limits within which it will perform its statutory duty gains support from this purpose, as well as from case law and statutory
law. Moreover, it is in keeping with the separation of powers
principle. It has proved to be a successful tool for the courts to
provide relief when unreasonable delay occurs in federal administrative agencies.
CONCLUSION
While it has been said that "one man's delay is another man's
due process,"' 139 few would be able to justify the administrative
delays suffered by many applicants for disability benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act. The delays come at a time
when an applicant's coping mechanisms are marginal at best.
Although a determination of the unreasonableness of the delay
may include consideration of the Agency's budgetary constraints,
this factor should not override the irreparable harm to an applicant caused by a failure to reach a prompt decision.
With few exceptions, broad discretion is given to the Social
Security Administration to formulate its own procedure. A judicial role, however, is not precluded when the agency fails to meet
its statutory duty. Recent federal court decisions mandating that
the Agency must complete its disability determination process
within judicially prescribed time limits are in violation of the
separation of powers principle. Moreover, as the courts concede,
attempts to provide a remedy through such limited means cannot solve a problem that is nationwide. Additionally, such an
approach may do more harm than good by adding an inestimable financial burden on the Agency or by forcing the Agency to
make hasty, potentially incorrect decisions.

138. In the APA's legislative history, Senator McCarran, the author of the bill which
later became the APA, reported that it was the intention of the compelling provision to
give a party injured by a violation of one of the terms of the bill the right of enforcement,
emphasizing that no agency would be permitted to cause any person to suffer injury due
to unwarranted official delay. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1946).
139. Skiffington, supra note 97, at 679.
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This does not mean, however, that the courts must abdicate
their responsibility to see that the Agency performs its statutory
duty. In the case of administrative delay by the Social Security
Administration, courts should compel the Agency to promulgate
rules prescribing, with specificity, time limits within which it
will carry out its administrative tasks. These rules would then be
subject to review by the courts to insure that they are carried out.
With each tribunal operating within its own area of expertise,
the interests of the disability applicant are thus best met.
MARY TODD ALRED

